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The Appellee, Sandra Moore, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Reply Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has original jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (i) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's finding that the Decree of Divorce 
provided for a minimum subsistence level of $1,500 per month which 
amount was to continue for three years regardless of remarriage or 
emancipation clearly erroneous? 
2. Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in denying 
David Moore's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and by concluding 
that David Moore was solely responsible to provide medical coverage 
for the children? 
3. Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that gifts of cash, clothing and cars made directly to the children 
are not considered child support? 
4. Did the trial Court err as a matter of law in concluding 
that David Moore failed to establish a substantial and material 
change in circumstances which permitted the reduction of his child 
support obligation after the entry of the decree of divorce? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact may be set aside if found 
to be clearly erroneous. Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The trial court's legal conclusions will be given 
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no deference and will be reviewed for legal correctness. General 
Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following statutory provisions are determinative of the 
issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(5) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce proceeding, specifically dealing with the 
child support issues. This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered after a bench trial held on 
October 27, 1993. The judgment was entered in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, the Honorable Ray M. Harding 
presiding. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce in 1986. (R.3) 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 25, 1987. (R. 58) . On 
February 27, 1987, Sandra Moore filed a verified Petition for Order 
to Show Cause re: Contempt and Child Support Arrearage. (R. 68). 
David Moore filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (R. 95) 
and Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (R. 99). 
Trial on the Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify was 
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held before Judge Harding on October 2" :<» K (R. 3 87 
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that Plaintiff is going to accept a job which will initially pay 
approximately $2,000.00 per month. The parties are ordered to 
exchange financial information and disclose their respective 
financial statements each year and renegotiate the level of support 
and maintenance between them once each year for three (3) years at 
which time a permanent level of support shall be fixed. For 
purposes of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby ordered that the 
minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be reduced or modified before 
June 1, 1988." (R. 56-57). 
4. At the trial, Judge Harding specifically found that under 
the Decree, alimony was $3 00.00 per month and child support was 
$200.00 per month per child. (R. 403-405, 415-420). 
5. Judge Harding ordered any child support arrearages to be 
offset by any amounts previously paid for alimony and child 
support. (R. 403-405, 415-420). 
6. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David 
Moore was earning $2,000.00 per month but it was anticipated that 
David Moore's earnings would increase in the future. (R. 471, 630, 
54-58) . 
7. The Decree stated that the $1,500.00 per month would not 
be modified before June 1, 1988. (R. 54-58). 
8. David Moore filed his Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on or about August 26, 1989. (R. 95). 
9. In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried. (R. 636). 
10. In August, 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and in April, 
1990, Holly Moore turned 18. (R. 47-53). 
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11. In March, 1993, Matt Moore turned 18. (R. 47-53). 
15. David Moore paid Sandra Moore $1,500.00 per month in 
combined child support and alimony from July 1987 through July 
1988. 
16. In August, 1988, David Moore unilaterally began paying 
Sandra Moore $1,000.00 in child support, terminating his $300.00 
per month alimony and reducing the child support by $200.00 based 
on Janessa turning 18 in August, 1988. (R. 463, 425-420). 
17. From August 1988 through April 1990, when Holly Moore 
turned 18, David Moore paid child support in the amount of $16,214 
in child support to Sandra Moore. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10 and 
Defendant Exhibit 26). 
18. From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly Moore lived 
with David Moore in Sandy, Utah. For that seven month period of 
time, David Moore unilaterally reduced his child support payments 
to Sandra Moore by $200.00 representing support to Holly during 
those months. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-
420) . 
19. From April 1990 through March 1991, David Moore paid 
Sandra Moore $9,100.00 in child support. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, 
Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420). 
20. Sandra Moore testified that from April 1991 through the 
time of trial David Moore failed to pay any child support. (R. 
668) . 
21. David Moore did pay Sandra Moore the sum of $3,000.00 in 
December 1992 or January 1993 and an additional $2,900.00 in April 
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199 3 with instruction to Sandra Moore that such funds were being 
paid as child support but were intended to pay for the then adult 
children's missions. David Moore sent letters to his children 
explaining the foregoing. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 
25, R. 384, R. 415-420, 575-581). 
22. In June 1993, David Moore unilaterally attempted to pay 
Sandra Moore child support by delivering a 1983 Chevy Citation to 
Sandra Moore. Sandra Moore did not ask for the vehicle or 
communicate to David Moore her acceptance of the vehicle as child 
support. At the time of trial, the vehicle was not titled in 
Sandra Moore's name nor did Sandra Moore have any claim or interest 
in the vehicle. (R. 403-405, 657-659). 
23. Sandra Moore testified that following the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce, David Moore would unilaterally make deductions 
from his child support obligation without forewarning or consulting 
Sandra Moore and she was expected to accept his generosity 
regardless of its compliance with the orders of the Court. (R. 
656) . 
24. In September, 1991, David Moore, who was ordered to 
maintain medical insurance for the benefit of the minor children, 
commenced making COBRA payments first in the amount of $625.00 per 
then and in April, 1992 to $722.00. At the same time, Moore 
unilaterally discontinued his child support payments to Sandra 
Moore. (R. 495-498). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court correctly ruled that the $1,500.00 per month 
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subsistence payment was to continue for a minimum of three years 
after the decree of divorce. The evidence before the Court 
established that David Moore had a history of substantial earnings 
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce. The Court concluded 
based on the evidence before it that the intentions of the parties 
were that this level of support was bare subsistence for Sandra 
Moore and that the parties entered into the agreement based on the 
belief that David Moore would soon gain new employment which was 
comparable to his historical earnings. The Court's ruling was 
within the broad discretion of its equitable powers in fashioning 
a remedy in the context of divorce action. As such, David Moore 
was not improperly assessed any monies for alimony or child 
support. 
The trial court correctly required David Moore to accept total 
responsibility for providing health insurance coverage for the 
minor children from July 1987 through October 1993. Sandra Moore 
believes that the terms of the decree of divorce govern the 
respective rights and obligations of the parties. Pursuant to the 
terms of the decree, David Moore was responsible for the payment of 
the health insurance coverage for the minor children. Sandra Moore 
argues that prior to an order issuing modifying the terms of the 
decree of divorce, those terms govern. Because David Moore is 
required maintain the medical insurance for the benefit of the 
minor children, the trial court correctly ruled that he was not 
entitled to any credit for the premiums paid. 
The trial court correctly ruled that David Moore failed to 
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establish a substantial and material change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of the child support as set forth in the 
decree of divorce. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to adopt the proposed findings submitted by David Moore. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE $1,500.00 PAYMENTS 
MADE BY DAVID MOORE WERE TO CONTINUE FOR THREE YEARS 
REGARDLESS OF ANY CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Prior to the entry of the decree, the parties negotiated a 
settlement. The parties agreed that the minimum amount which 
Sandra Moore needed as subsistence was $1,500.00 per month. Sandra 
Moore testified that while there was discussion concerning what 
portion of the monies were to be designated as alimony or child 
support, the parties never reached an agreement as to any such 
formula. (R. 632). David Moore does not assign as error the 
Court's finding of fact that said subsistence payment in fact 
consisted of $3 00.00 per month alimony and $2 00.00 per month per 
child for child support. Rather, David Moore assigns as error the 
Court's conclusion of law that said subsistence payments were to 
continue without modification for a period of three years from the 
entry of the decree. Sandra Moore believes that the Court 
correctly ruled and requests this Court affirm on this issue. 
The Moore's were divorced by decree of the Court on or about 
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August 25, 1987. The decree was based on the negotiations of the 
parties and a stipulation entered into and signed by the parties. 
David Moore correctly argues that the Court admitted extrinsic 
evidence to ascertain and explain the parties intents concerning 
the disputed paragraph of the decree. The paragraph of the decree 
in dispute reads 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500.00 per month to Defendant, 
in cash each month, for alimony and child support. This 
amount is regarded as minimum subsistence level for Defendant 
and her six children notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff 
is going to accept a job which will initially pay 
approximately $2,000.00 per month. The parties are ordered to 
exchange financial information and disclose their respective 
financial statements each year and renegotiate the level of 
support and maintenance between them once ear year for three 
(3) years at which time a permanent level of support shall be 
fixed. For purposes of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby 
ordered that the minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be 
reduced or modified before June 1, 1988." (R. 56-57). 
Having heard all testimony regarding the negotiations of the 
stipulation and regarding the payments, Judge Harding correctly 
ruled "the stipulation entered into by the parties, and the decree, 
provide a minimum subsistence level for the Defendant and her six 
children of $1500 per month." (R. 405). Further, after carefully 
considering all of the testimony of the witnesses and their 
respective demeanors, the Court concluded that the parties intended 
that the payments would continue for three years regardless of 
remarriage of Sandra Moore or emancipation of any of the minor 
children. 
The trial court conclusion that the minimum subsistence 
payment was intended to continue for three years is a correct 
conclusion of law. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-3(5) 
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provides: 
Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, 
any order of the Court that a party Pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the 
former spouse. 
In the present case, the decree of divorce does specify 
otherwise. Specifically, the Decree of Divorce contemplates that 
no permanent award of alimony or child support shall be fixed for 
three years after the entry of the decree of divorce. The 
testimony of Sandra Moore makes it clear that it was her 
expectation that Mr. Moore would obtain employment comparable to 
his historical earnings. Based thereon, it was her belief that 
when the permanent support levels were in fact set, they would be 
going up. 
The trial court correctly heard extrinsic evidence and 
properly concluded that it was the intent of the parties that such 
subsistence level payments would continue for a period of three 
years. This conclusion is bolstered by the plain language of the 
decree which states "Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500.00 per 
month to Defendant, in cash each month, for alimony and child 
support. This amount is regarded as minimum subsistence level for 
Defendant and her six children notwithstanding the fact that 
Plaintiff is going to accept a job which will initially pay 
approximately $2,000.00 per month." 
The plain language of the decree speaks for itself. David 
Moore stipulated that the minimum subsistence level for his wife 
and six children was $1,500.00. He did so knowing that he was 
taking a job which paid only $2,000.00 per month as gross monthly 
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income. David Moore clearly entered into this agreement because he 
believed that he was capable of earning more than his then present 
income and that he could support the obligations contained in the 
stipulated decree of divorce. 
Further, David Moore knew that the permanent level of support 
would not be established until three years from the date of the 
entry of the decree. Mr. Moore presented no testimony before the 
Court that he believed that this provision was included in order 
that his permanent support might be lower than the minimum 
subsistence level. In contrast, Sandra Moore did testify that she 
believed the purpose of this provision was for an increased amount 
of support. (R. 632-633). 
Sandra Moore urges this Court to affirm the trial court's 
conclusion of law that the parties intended that the subsistence 
level payments continue until such time as permanently established 
pursuant to the terms of the decree. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DAVID MOORE SHOULD BE 
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF HEALTH 
INSURANCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN TOGETHER WITH 
THE PAYMENT OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
The trial court correctly ruled that David Moore be required 
to continue to maintain medical insurance coverage for the benefit 
of the minor children. As such, this Court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
As noted above, the parties were divorced based on a decree 
entered following the parties entering into a stipulation. (R. 
38, 405). Pursuant to the Stipulation, paragraph 9, it states 
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That in addition to payment of child support and spousal 
support the minor children and Defendant are in need of 
medical insurance coverage. Plaintiff agrees to furnish and 
pay for medical insurance coverage and to pay 100% of all 
deductible charges and non-covered expenses for medical 
treatment for the minor children and to the extent possible to 
maintain the same group coverage on the Defendant with her 
paying the costs of said coverage. 
(R. 3 5-3 6). This paragraph was incorporated into the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce verbatim. 
(R. 47-51, 58). 
On or about April 4, 1989, Sandra Moore filed a Verified 
Petition for Order to Show Cause in re: Contempt and Child Support 
Arrearages. (R. 68) Specifically, this action was filed to 
enforce the terms of the Decree of Divorce. In response to this 
Order to Show Cause, David Moore filed a Petition to Modify the 
Decree. (R. 95). 
In the Petition to Modify the Decree, David Moore specifically 
requests that the Plaintiff be ordered to maintain medical 
insurance for the minor children and that the party who has custody 
of the children be ordered to be liable for all noncovered medical 
expenses incurred for the minor children. (R. 92-95). Thus, at 
least with respect to the liability for the payment of the medical 
insurance of the minor children, the Plaintiff David Moore did not 
seek a modification of the terms of the decree of divorce. Thus, 
the trial court correctly ruled that he be required to continue to 
maintain the medical insurance for the benefit of the minor 
children. 
David Moore filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment. 
(R. 421-422). In this Motion, David Moore sought for the first 
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time to modify the allocation of the cost of the payment of the 
premium for the medical insurance. Judge Harding denied the Motion 
based on his earlier decision on the issue of medical insurance. 
(R. 443-444). 
David Moore cites to various sections of the Utah Code in 
support of his argument that Sandra Moore should be required to pay 
one half of both the medical insurance premium and one half of the 
uninsured medical expenses. However, the laws referred to by David 
Moore were not enacted until after the trial in this matter. The 
laws in existence at the time of the trial on this matter are 
stated as follows: 
Section 78-45-7.1, Utah Code Annotated. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order 
makes no specific provision for the payment of medical and 
dental expenses for dependent children, the Court in its 
order: 
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility 
for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses for the dependent children; and 
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital and dental 
care for those children if insurance coverage is or 
becomes available at a reasonable cost. 
Section 78-45-7.15/ Utah Code Annotated. 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums 
for children are included in the base combined child support 
obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in 
the table. 
The child support order shall require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical 
and dental expenses, including routine office visits, 
physical examinations, immunizations, and 
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses in a 
ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or 
administrative agency. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at 
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a reasonable cost and the children would gain more complete 
coverage by doing so, both parents shall be ordered to 
maintain insurance for the dependent children. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a 
reasonable cost or if no advantage to the children's coverage 
would result, the parent who can obtain the most favorable 
coverage shall be ordered to maintain that insurance. 
Based on the statutes in effect at the time of the trial, the 
Court was not required to make any order concerning medical 
insurance an expenses as there was already an order in effect at 
the time of trial. Additionally, David Moore specifically and 
knowingly entered into a stipulation whereby he agreed to assume 
100% of all liability for the payment of the insurance premiums and 
the medical expenses not covered by the insurance. In his Petition 
to Modify, he failed to allege a substantial and material change in 
circumstances which would justify the modification of that 
provision. Finally, pursuant to the statute, the Court has the 
authority and discretion to order only one party to maintain 
medical insurance for the benefit of the minor children and to 
allocate the liability for the payment of medical expenses which 
are not covered by insurance. This is specifically what the Court 
did by approving the parties' stipulation, incorporating the terms 
into a decree of divorce and in its ruling at the trial in this 
matter. As such, the Court properly held that the Plaintiff is 
responsible for the payment of the medical insurance premium and 
the uninsured medical expenses incurred for the benefit of the 
minor children. 
Sandra Moore again respectfully urges this Court to affirm the 
ruling of the trial court. 
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Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO 
THE CHILDREN AND OTHER EXPENSES PAID ON BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN 
INCLUDING MEDICAL INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND UNINSURED MEDICAL 
EXPENSES WERE NOT CHILD SUPPORT. 
Because the trial court correctly ruled that David Moore's 
payment of monies directly to the children or for expenses on their 
behalf, including medical insurance premiums and uninsured medical 
expenses, were not child support, this Court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
David Moore's argument that all sums paid directly to the 
children, for expenses on behalf of the children, medical insurance 
premiums and uninsured medical expenses is misplaced. First, there 
is nothing in the Decree which permits such offsets against his 
support obligation. 
Second, Utah Code is clear as to what may be considered a 
permissible offset against child support. Section 78-45-7.15 
specifically states that medical insurance premiums may be used in 
the child support calculation and that uninsured medical could not 
be. However, as noted above, David Moore specifically stipulated 
that he would be solely and 100% liable for the medical insurance 
premiums and uninsured medical expenses without seeking any kind of 
offset against his child support. 
Further, David Moore failed to present any evidence before the 
Court as to what the child's portion he paid of the medical 
insurance premiums. While Mr. Moore discussed his dilemma as to 
which part of the Decree to ignore, he failed to in any way state 
who was covered under the policy during what periods of time. As 
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such, there was no evidence before the Court as to the child's 
portion of the medical insurance premium for any given time period. 
Additionally, it is equally clear that gifts made to the 
children in the form of cash, clothing, or paying their expenses do 
not constitute child support to Sandra Moore. As further evidence 
of this fact, David Moore has failed to provide any case law or 
statutory citations of the Utah Code which support his untenable 
position. There is no legal support for the proposition that in 
kind contributions to children (and perhaps to adult children to 
whom David Moore's legal obligation has ceased leaving him only his 
moral obligations to wrestle with) in any form constitute child 
support or offsets thereto. This is especially true when the 
decision to make such payments is unilaterally made by the obligor, 
David Moore. 
Thus, this court should affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD REMAIN 
AT THE AMOUNT SET AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE STIPULATION 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES UPON WHICH THE DECREE WAS BASED. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the child support amount 
should remain at the amount specified by the parties at the time of 
the entry of the Stipulation and Decree of Divorce. This Court 
should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
At the time of the entry of the decree of divorce, David Moore 
was unemployed. However, he anticipated gaining immediate 
employment which would pay him approximately $2,000.00 in gross 
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revenues per month. David Moore testified both verbally and in the 
form of exhibits that at the time of trial he was again unemployed 
(and one can only assume based on the totality of his testimony) 
about to procure another job. In the intervening period of time, 
David Moore testified that he earned $20,639.00 in 1987, $21,197 in 
1988, $26,883 in 1989, $37,610 in 1990, $35,404 in 1991, $10,710 in 
1992 and no income during 1993 while he was seeking a job. 
These income figures show that on average, Mr. Moore was 
earning historically approximately the same amount which he was 
earning at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce. As 
such, the trial court refused to modify the child support in 
accordance with the request of Mr. Moore. 
Further, the issue of the modification of child support was 
never properly brought before the trial court. As noted above, 
David Moore filed a Petition to Modify Decree. (R. 92-95). 
However, at no place in the Petition to Modify the Decree does 
David Moore seek a change in the child support amount other than 
reductions in the amount of $200.00 per child when said child 
reaches the age of eighteen. Thus, not only did the trial court 
reach the right conclusion, it reached the only possible conclusion 
in light of the fact that the issue of a modification of the child 
support amount was never brought before the Court by way of either 
Petition to Modify or Sandra Moore's order to show cause. 
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled on each of the issues of this 
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court, 
Dated this ^P0 day of /V/M ., 1996, 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
78-45-7.1 JUDICIAL CODE 
mother's health, and set the award at $200 per 
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Modification of support-
—Divorce decree. 
The divorce decree establishes the duty of 
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and 
a complaint under this section to modify that 
duty of support is improper. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
State, which was joined as a party to the di-
vorce action before court entered order deter-
mining husband's obligation for child support, 
was entitled to reimbursement from the hus-
band for assistance furnished the child before 
entry of the order for support in the amount, 
based upon the relevant factors as set out in 
this section, as set out in the support order. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor, 
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note. New Standards 
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 591. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L Rev. 859. 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent 
and Child § 54 et seq. 
C-J.8. — 41 C J .S . Husband and Wife § 48 
et seq.; 67A CJ.S. Parent and Child S 50. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *» 4; 
Parent and Child *» 3.1(5). 
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent chil-
dren — Assigning responsibility for payment — 
Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific 
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent chil-
dren, the court in its order: 
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent 
children; and 
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children 
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 13, 5 3; 1990, ch. 166, 5 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the sub-
section designations, substituted "is or be-
comes available" for "is available" in Subsec-
tion (2), and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance 
and health care of parties, i 30-3-5. 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establish-
ing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from 
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78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance. 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are 
included in the base combined child support obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table. 
The child support order shall require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental 
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and im-
munizations; and 
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropri-
ate court or administrative agency. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost 
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both 
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent chil-
dren. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or 
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who 
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that 
insurance. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, S 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(2Mb), deleted "equally" after "share" and 
added the language beginning "in a ratio." 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.16, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all 
known reasonable and necessary uninsured ex-
traordinary medical expenses and" from the 
beginning, deleted "in addition to the base 
child support award" after "to be paid," and 
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for 
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2); and 
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Un-
less the expenses described in Subsection (1) 
are included in the child support order, or the 
parents enter into a written agreement to 
share the expenses, one parent may not obli-
gate both parents to pay the expenses." 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall 
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases 
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the 
child support order. 
